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CIRCUIT’S NO-GIFT RULE IN IN RE DBSD 
Michael Carnevale
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INTRODUCTION 
In the context of a Chapter 11 reorganization, a debtor in possession 
historically has had a significant amount of flexibility in crafting a plan of 
reorganization.  During the recent reorganization of communications 
company DBSD North America, Inc. (hereinafter “DBSD”), however, the 
doctrine of gifting—which has at times lent itself to creativity on the part of 
corporate debtors—was significantly restricted.  The doctrine known as 
“gifting” in the context of the Bankruptcy Code is one, which, in its 
modern development, had evolved from a limited origin in 1993 to a more 
expansive use over the following decade.  Courts had frequently confirmed 
plans of reorganization where creditors “in the money” voluntarily shared 
some of their proceeds with those “out of the money” for various strategic 
purposes.  Some insist that this framework encourages creativity in 
restructuring, while others characterize the practice as a method of short-
circuiting the seniority-based distribution scheme controlling bankruptcy 
and diverting a debtor’s scarce available proceeds in violation of the 
Bankruptcy Code.  The practice had frequently been treated with approval 
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by the bankruptcy courts, but now it has been largely gutted as a result of 
the Second Circuit’s decision in Dish Network Corp. v. DBSD North 
America, Inc. (In re DBSD),
1
 taken in combination with a Third Circuit 
ruling from 2005 that also held improper the confirmation of a plan 
involving gifting.
2
  The Second Circuit in DBSD overruled both the 
bankruptcy court and the district court and applied a narrow interpretation 
theory to the provision in the Bankruptcy Code often referred to as the 
absolute priority rule.
3
 
The Second Circuit’s decision raises some important questions about 
the future of creative reorganization practices.  This Comment takes the 
position that the decision creates a circuit split that is not fully 
acknowledged by the courts and, as such, is an important issue that should 
be adjudicated by the Supreme Court. This Comment will argue that, 
although the DBSD court appears to have interpreted the Bankruptcy Code 
correctly, there are some difficulties with the Second Circuit’s reasoning.  
Specifically, the court strained to avoid rejecting a prior First Circuit 
approach,
4
 possibly to avoid explicitly declaring a circuit split.  This 
Comment will argue that, in reality, a split has developed between the First 
Circuit and the Second and Third Circuits based on their recent decisions in 
DBSD and Armstrong.  The DBSD decision also calls into question what is 
known as the “New Value Corollary,” which is a more frequently used 
strategy than gifting in Chapter 11 corporate reorganizations.  As a result of 
the most recent decision, what remains is a confusing web of rules on 
gifting that constitutes a circuit split in all but name. 
The 2005 Armstrong decision appears to have carefully avoided 
rejecting the First Circuit’s In re SPM Manufacturing Corp. decision.  And 
now the 2011 DBSD decision was careful to claim that its holding was in 
harmony with both of those prior circuit decisions.  Yet each of the three 
opinions lays out a different approach to determining when gifting is or is 
not appropriate, and each conflicts with the others in important ways.  This 
Comment will argue that gifting is a more problematic doctrine than new 
value, both from a policy perspective and from a textual one.  The 
Comment will further argue that, should the Supreme Court agree to hear a 
case involving the gifting doctrine, the meaning of the applicable statute in 
the Code can be clarified, and the pall cast over the new value corollary 
will be lifted.  With the meaning of the code clear on both doctrines, 
practitioners can then lobby Congress to amend the Code to allow gifting in 
 
 1.  634 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2011) [hereinafter DSBD]. 
 2.  In re Armstrong World Indus., 432 F.3d 507 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 3.  11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (2012). 
 4.  In re SPM Mfg. Corp., 984 F.2d 1305 (1st Cir. 1993). 
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limited circumstances the next time the code is amended if they believe that 
the doctrine is important enough to successful complex reorganizations.
5
 
I. THE ORIGINS AND RISE OF GIFTING 
A. Early Origins 
The propriety of what is currently termed “gifting” can be traced back 
to Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Boyd,
6
 a 1913 Supreme Court case that 
reined in creative reorganization practices.  As a receivership bar grew in 
the years leading up to Boyd, reorganizations, almost exclusively involving 
railroads,
7
 had become increasingly complex and creative.
8
  In order to 
address what was seen as collusion in railroad reorganizations, wherein 
railroad owners often would retain control of an interest in the entity after 
receivership proceedings, while some creditors would be excluded from 
recovery, the judge-made “absolute priority rule” emerged.
9
  In Boyd, 
 
 5.  During the final phase of preparation for publication, another student comment was 
published discussing some of the material in this comment.  See Lauren E. McDivitt, 
Comment, What Do You Mean There Won’t be Gifts This Year?: Why Practitioners Cannot 
Rely Upon Gifting Provisions in Chapter 11 Reorganization Plans in the Fifth Circuit, 44 
TEX. TECH L. REV. 1019 (2012).  After tracing the history of the gifting doctrine through 
DBSD, the author proposes that the Fifth Circuit may not approve of plans involving gifting.  
Id. at 1039-45.  The author arrives at this conclusion by analyzing two Fifth Circuit cases 
that she finds instructive and also writes that the Fifth Circuit may find DBSD “more 
persuasive” than prior cases from other circuits.  Id. at 1044-45.  Further, the author 
suggests workarounds for practitioners where gifting might otherwise have been utilized.  
Id. at 1045-50.  This Comment, on the other hand, does not focus on the application of this 
line of cases in any particular circuit.  Instead, it proposes that a circuit split that has not 
been fully acknowledged exists in this area of the law and suggests that the issue is ripe for 
consideration by the Supreme Court.  This Comment also observes how the DBSD ruling 
might be interpreted to call into question another doctrine used at times by creative 
practitioners, the new value doctrine.  In conclusion, this Comment suggests a judicial 
framework wherein these issues could be resolved in a manner that is both practical and 
consistent with the objectives of the Bankruptcy Code. 
 6.  228 U.S. 482 (1913). 
 7.  See Robert T. Swaine, Reorganization of Corporations: Certain Developments of 
the Last Decade, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 901 (1927) (noting that as of 1916, over eighty 
railroads were in receivership, representing about sixteen percent of the total rail mileage in 
the United States). 
 8.  See DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN 
AMERICA 66 (2001) (describing Boyd in detail and explaining why it was a “major judicial 
setback” for receivership lawyers). 
 9.  See In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452, 463 n.17 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(explaining that “[t]he absolute priority rule originated as a ‘judicial invention designed to 
preclude the practice in railroad reorganizations of ‘squeezing out’ intermediate unsecured 
creditors through collusion between secured creditors and stockholders (who were often the 
same people.’”)) (quoting In re Wabash Valley Power Ass’n, 72 F.3d 1305, 1314 (7th Cir. 
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stockholders had been allowed to participate in the reorganization of the 
Northern Pacific Railroad upon paying an assessment, while certain 
unsecured creditors were excluded from the plan.
10
  This had become a 
common practice, where shareholders would contribute capital to a 
reorganized entity, yet existing unsecured creditors would be excluded.
11
  
After the equity receivership court approved the plan, an unsecured creditor 
sued the reorganized railroad on the theory that stockholders had received 
an interest in the new company, while unsecured creditors were shut out, 
violating the proper priority of distribution.
12
  By a 5-4 vote, the Supreme 
Court held that a transfer by a bondholder—or in the parlance of Chapter 
11 reorganizations, a secured creditor—to stockholders was invalid, and the 
unsecured creditor could pursue its claim, even though the bondholder had 
no obligation to make the transfer, and had to give up value that it had 
rightful claim over in order to make the transfer.
13
  The court found that 
“[a]ny device . . . whereby stockholders were preferred before the creditor 
was invalid [under the Bankruptcy Act].”
14
  The “fair and equitable” rule 
that came out of Boyd thus came to be a vertical test that ensures that 
liquidation or reorganization proceeds are distributed in order of priority of 
claims, and no creditors or classes of creditors are skipped in favor of more 
junior creditors or equity holders.
15
  The Boyd rule became known as the 
“fixed principle,” standing for the notion that equity was never to be paid 
when debt was not first paid in full.
16
  But Boyd did not use the term 
“absolute priority,” and it was not initially clear that such a rigid rule was 
demanded.  In the wake of Boyd, some practitioners, led by Robert Swaine, 
a prominent reorganization lawyer of the time, argued that Boyd demanded 
only “relative priorit[y].”
17
  Swaine predicted, ultimately incorrectly, that 
future courts interpreting Boyd would only require that each class retaining 
 
1995)); Skeel, supra note 8 at 56-59 (providing a history of the railroad equity receiverships 
in the period leading up to Boyd). 
 10.  Boyd, 228 U.S. at 504. 
 11.  Skeel, supra note 8, at 67. 
 12.  Boyd, 228 U.S. at 498. 
 13.  Id. at 502. 
 14.  Id. at 504. 
 15.  See Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 118–19 (1939) (declaring that 
the Boyd doctrine interpreting the term “fair and equitable,” found in the Bankruptcy Act of 
1898, is “firmly imbedded” in the Act). 
 16.  See Harvey R. Miller & Ronit J. Berkovich, The Implications of the Third Circuit’s 
Armstrong Decision on Creative Corporate Restructuring: Will Strict Construction of the 
Absolute Priority Rule Make Chapter 11 Consensus Less Likely?, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1345, 
1349 (2006) (describing the history of Boyd and noting that the rule that came out of it was 
one requiring that equity must never be paid in a reorganization if creditors are not paid in 
full). 
 17.  Swaine, supra note 7, at 907. 
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an interest in the reorganized entity retain its “relative position” in relation 
to other security holders, which would not prevent offers to participate in 
the reorganized entity from being extended to the various classes, so long 
as the offers were fair given the position of each class.
18
  Swaine even 
maintained that such a broad interpretation of Boyd as the one ultimately 
taken would make “successful corporate reorganizations impossible,” 
because equity holders are often the only source of new capital, and their 
participation is often essential and frequently can only be obtained by 
giving the stockholder something of value exceeding any new capital it 
contributes.
19
  Partially in response to Swaine’s argument for a “relative” 
priority rule, in a debate played out over the pages of the Columbia Law 
Review, James C. Bonbright and Milton M. Bergerman termed Boyd’s 
requirement an “absolute priority” rule.
20
  Bonbright and Bergerman saw a 
danger in failing to impose a strict absolute priority test.  They argued that 
in railroad reorganizations, junior security holders consistently received 
returns at the expense of senior security holders, even beyond the extent 
necessary to raise new capital.
21
  In the end, it was the absolute rule that 
won out in the courts.
22
  This common law rule was later codified in the 
1978 Bankruptcy Code at § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii), which provides in relevant 
part that “the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of 
such class will not receive or retain under the plan on account of such 
junior claim or interest any property.”
23
  Under the enactment of the Code, 
however, the absolute priority rule only took effect if an objecting class of 
creditors existed.
24
 
 
 18.  Id. at 907–08, 912.  In essence, Swaine argued that equity still retained a going 
concern value in a reorganization, which Boyd did not require be zeroed out, as in a 
liquidation.  Id. 
 19.  Id. at 915. 
 20.  James C. Bonbright & Milton M. Bergerman, Two Rival Theories of the Priority 
Rights of Security Holders in a Corporate Reorganization, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 127, 130 
(1928). 
 21.  Id. at 144.  Bonbright and Bergerman observed that courts in the wake of Boyd 
tended not to upset a plan which was supported by a “substantial majority” of bondholders 
just because it violated absolute priorities, as long as approximate relative priorities were 
maintained.  However, they called on the Supreme Court to require absolute priority if and 
when the issue came before it.  Id. at 155–56. 
 22.  See Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 107 (1939) (Supreme Court’s 
adoption of absolute priority rule). 
 23.  11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2012); see also In re Snyder, 967 F.2d 1126, 1128 
(7th Cir. 1992) (explaining that § 1129(b) codified the absolute priority rule, although under 
the Code a plan may be confirmed by the consent of the impaired classes pursuant to 11 
U.S.C. §1126(c), which was an alteration of the common law rule). 
 24.  11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2012). 
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B. SPM—The Origin of Gifting Under the Modern Bankruptcy Code 
The origin of gifting under the modern Bankruptcy Code is generally 
traced to the First Circuit’s decision in In re SPM Mfg. Corp.
25
  The debtor 
in SPM originally filed in Chapter 11; however, the proceeding was later 
converted into a Chapter 7 liquidation after difficulties confirming a 
reorganization plan.
26
  In SPM, a perfected first-priority secured creditor 
had a $9 million claim,
27
 while the debtor’s assets were only worth $5 
million.
28
  Next in order came a tax claim that was a priority unsecured 
claim, and that the owners of the debtor corporation were personally liable 
for in the event it was not satisfied under the plan.
29
  In order to secure 
cooperation of the unsecured creditors’ committee while the plan was still 
in Chapter 11, the secured creditor agreed to share, on a sliding scale basis, 
the proceeds of the eventual liquidation or reorganization with the class of 
general unsecured creditors, but not satisfy the tax debt constituting the 
priority unsecured claim.
30
  The agreement called for not only the satisfying 
of the committee’s attorney’s costs and fees, but also a sharing of the 
proceeds above and beyond such a carve out.
31
  After the plan was 
converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation, the debtor took a position against the 
gifting, evidently because the owners of the family enterprise would 
otherwise owe the priority unsecured debt personally.
32
  The unsecured 
creditors’ committee argued that once the proceeds were distributed to the 
sole creditor that was entitled to receive anything in liquidation, the funds 
were no longer part of the estate and the creditor could do as it wished.
33
   
The First Circuit agreed, overruling both the bankruptcy court and the 
district court.
34
  A class that is “in the money” might want to share some of 
its proceeds with a class that is “out of the money” in order to avoid 
litigation, retain old management, secure cooperation, or achieve other 
strategic goals.  The First Circuit pointed out that just as the Code would 
permit a priority creditor to voluntarily convey funds “to some or all of the 
general, unsecured creditors after the bankruptcy proceedings finished,” so 
 
 25.  984 F.2d 1305 (1st Cir. 1993) [hereinafter SPM]. 
 26.  Id. at 1308. 
 27.  In essence, this means that the creditor had the first right to any monies received by 
the bankruptcy estate.  This first-priority creditor was secured by a lien against substantially 
all of the debtor’s property.  Id. 
 28.  Id. at 1307. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. at 1308. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. at 1313. 
 34.  Id. 
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could a secured creditor “enter into a contract during bankruptcy in which 
it promises to do the same thing.”
35
  The First Circuit also held that the 
distribution scheme under the Bankruptcy Code “does not come into play 
until all valid liens on the property are satisfied,”
36
 and because the secured 
claim absorbed all of the debtor’s assets, no one else had a claim of right to 
those assets under the Bankruptcy Code.
37
 
As might be expected, the SPM holding invited practitioners to test 
how broadly courts might be willing to construe its reasoning, and in 
general, creative restructuring agreements were met with success over the 
following decade.  As Daniel Bussel and Kenneth Klee put it, “SPM-ing 
became all the rage” once Bankruptcy lawyers realized that courts were 
allowing senior creditors to make deals with “junior juniors” without 
providing for intervening classes.
38
  One decision confirmed a plan 
involving “gifts” made directly from the estate by unsecured, rather than 
secured, creditors in the context of a Chapter 11 reorganization 
confirmation:  all circumstances differing from the SPM facts.
39
  Other 
courts confirmed plans that involved gifting not to unsecured creditors, but 
to equity.
40
  Gifting came to be seen by many practitioners as a way to 
encourage creative deal making that increased overall value, and 
discouraged holdout behavior.
41
  Parties “out of the money,” they reason, 
will always object and litigate if possible, not because they were unfairly 
circumvented and deprived of a legitimate claim, but to use the threats of 
litigation and delay to extract value for themselves.  Allowing these classes 
to receive a consensual gift could serve to prevent such value-destroying 
measures.
42
  Many of the subsequent cases broadening the doctrine cite in 
support the reasoning of SPM that “creditors are generally free to do 
whatever they wish with the bankruptcy dividends they receive, including 
to share them with other creditors.”
43
  As a failsafe, proponents of gifting 
argue that the Best Interests Test ensures that a plan cannot be confirmed 
 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. at 1312. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Daniel J. Bussel & Kenneth N. Klee, Recalibrating Consent in Bankruptcy, 83 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 663, 711 (2009). 
 39.  In re MCorp Fin. Inc., 160 B.R. 941 (S.D. Tex. 1993). 
 40.  See, e.g., In re Genesis Health Ventures, Inc., 266 B.R. 591 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001) 
(confirming a plan that conveyed a gift to equity). 
 41.  See Miller & Berkovich, supra note 16, at 1349 (arguing that permitting gifting 
furthers the policy objectives of Chapter 11). 
 42.  For a detailed discussion of the history of the absolute priority rule and the gifting 
doctrine, see id. at 1349-68. 
 43.  SPM, 984 F.2d at 1313; see also In re Journal Register Co., 407 B.R. 520 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing SPM for the rule that creditors can do what they wish with 
bankruptcy proceeds they receive). 
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over the objection of a creditor that would receive less than it would have 
in a liquidation proceeding.
44
  In any event, by the mid-2000’s, it was 
becoming more common for shareholders to get a piece of the 
reorganization pie, a trend that certainly included other phenomena besides 
increased use of gifting.
45
  One practitioner credited the increase in 
shareholder recoveries in the early part of the decade to “public outcry over 
the way shareholders’ fates were dealt with” in some of the large Chapter 
11 filings such as Enron.
46
 
C. Armstrong case narrows the use of gifting. 
In 2005, a circuit court visited the gifting doctrine for the first time 
since SPM in In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc.
47
 Armstrong rejected the 
particular plan that had been confirmed by the bankruptcy court on the 
grounds that the plan violated the plain language of the absolute priority 
rule.
48
 
Armstrong was characterized by some as a test on only the outer limits 
of gifting.  The proceeding involved an attempt by one class of unsecured 
creditors to “cram down” another class of unsecured creditors and gift to 
equity.
49
  Equity holders who wished to secure warrants in the reorganized 
debtor reached an agreement with a class of personal injury claimants, who 
were themselves anxious to get into the money.
50
  The personal injury 
claimants agreed to transfer warrants to the equity holder in the event that 
another unsecured creditor rejected a previously proposed plan under which 
the equity holders would obtain the warrants.
51
 
The bankruptcy court approved the plan,
52
 but after the district court 
overturned the confirmation,
53
 the Third Circuit upheld the district court’s 
ruling that the plan violated the absolute priority rule as adopted by the 
 
 44.  See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (a)(7)(A)(ii) (2012) (codifying the Best Interests Test in 
Chapter 11); 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (a)(4) (codifying the test for Chapter 13 proceedings); Miller 
& Berkovich, supra note 16, at 1374 (arguing that the “Best Interests Test” protects 
creditors from the abusive uses of gifting that Boyd was concerned with preventing). 
 45.  Lingling Wei, Holders Find Voice in Bankruptcies, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2003, at 
B4F. 
 46.  Id. (quoting Edward Weisfelner of Brown Rudnick Berlack & Israels LLP). 
 47.  In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc. (Armstrong II), 432 F.3d 507 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 48.  Id. at 514.  For a thorough history of the holding in Armstrong, see Miller & 
Berkovich, supra note 16, at 1412–18. 
 49.  Armstrong II, 432 F.3d at 509–10. 
 50.  Id. at 509. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc. (Armstrong I), 320 B.R. 523, 524 (D. Del. 
2005). 
 53.  Id. 
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Bankruptcy Code.
54
  The Third Circuit was careful to distinguish its 
holding from SPM, noting that since SPM involved a distribution under 
Chapter 7, the absolute priority rule was not implicated.
55
  The court noted 
that in SPM, the gifting party had a perfected security interest, thus making 
the property free from subjection to distribution under the Code’s scheme,
56
 
and that the SPM distribution was a “carve out.”
57
 
II. DBSD 
As a Third Circuit decision, Armstrong was binding on the courts in 
the District of Delaware, one of the most common forums for large 
corporate bankruptcies.
58
  The other large forum, the Southern District of 
New York, did not have a circuit opinion on the topic until DBSD came 
along in 2011.  In fact, the Second Circuit had avoided answering the 
question just four years earlier,
59
 but took the issue head-on in the DBSD 
case. 
A. The Facts 
Prior to filing for bankruptcy, DBSD had been a subsidiary of ICO 
Global, which formed it to develop a mobile communications network 
 
 54.  Armstrong II, 432 F.3d at 518. 
 55.  Id. at 518.  The Armstrong holding does not attempt to distinguish, however, the 
fact that the gifting agreement in SPM was made while the case was still in Chapter 11, and 
the SPM court clearly indicates it would have blessed the agreement even if it had stayed a 
Chapter 11 case.  See In re SPM Mfg. Corp., 984 F.2d 1305, 1317 (1st Cir. 1993) (“[W]e 
cannot find support for appellees’ assertion that this agreement conflicts with any policy in 
favor of reorganizations manifested by Chapter 11.”) 
 56.  Armstrong II, 432 F.3d at 514. 
 57.  Id.  Note that the Armstrong characterization of the SPM agreement as a “carve 
out” is inconsistent with the common use of the term.  The SPM plan called for payment of 
proceeds net of administrative expenses to the unsecured creditors on a sliding scale, 
starting at ten percent to the unsecured creditors for the first $3,000,000 of net proceeds.  
SPM, 984 F.2d at 1308.  But see Richard B. Levin, Almost All You Ever Wanted to Know 
About Carve Out, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 445 (2002) (“As generally used, a carve out is an 
agreement between a secured lender, on the one hand, and the trustee or debtor in 
possession . . . on the other, providing that a portion of the secured creditor’s collateral may 
be used to pay administrative expenses.”). 
 58.  See ED FLYNN & GORDON BERMANT, BANKRUPTCY BY THE NUMBERS 3, 
http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/public_affairs/articles/docs/abi_032002.pdf (last accessed 
Nov. 28, 2012) (stating that over a recent six year period, of the 105 largest bankruptcies, 56 
were filed in the District of Delaware, and 18 in the Southern District of New York, while 
no other single district had more than 3). 
 59.  See In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452, 460–61 (2d Cir. 2007) (declining 
to decide whether SPM applied to Chapter 11 settlements because the case could be decided 
on other grounds). 
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using satellites and transmission towers.
60
  In May 2009, DBSD filed for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy, listing $813 million in liabilities and $627 million 
in assets.
61
  A first-priority creditor with a security interest in substantially 
all of DBSD’s assets had a perfected lien in the amount of $40 million.
62
  A 
second-priority creditor who also held a security interest in substantially all 
of the debtor’s assets had a lien totaling $740 million at the time of filing.
63
  
The combined amount owed to these two creditors plainly exceeded the 
total assets of the company.  Following just as plainly is the fact that had it 
been a liquidation, these two secured creditors would have had the right to 
take DBSD’s assets in their entirety, with nothing left over for unsecured 
creditors or equity holders.  These two, however, were not the only 
creditors.  Sprint Nextel had an unliquidated and unsecured claim that was 
based upon a pending lawsuit.
64
 
DBSD ultimately proposed a reorganization plan wherein the first-
priority creditor would receive new debt in the reorganized entity, and the 
second-priority creditor would receive the majority of the common stock in 
the reorganized company, worth between fifty-one and seventy-three 
percent of its original claims.
65
  Under the proposed plan, Sprint would 
receive equity worth four to forty-six percent of its original claim,
66
 and the 
existing shareholder would receive approximately five percent of the equity 
in the reorganized entity.
67
  Sprint objected to the confirmation of this 
plan.
68
  Because Sprint was not entitled to recover from a liquidation 
perspective, as the bankruptcy court pointed out, its recovery was “based, 
ironically, on the gifting to which it object[ed].”
69
 
B. The Holdings 
Judge Gerber of the Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District of New 
York approved the plan over Sprint’s objection on absolute priority rule 
 
 60.  In re DBSD N. Am., Inc. (DBSD II), 634 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 61.  Id. at 86. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  In re DBSD N. Am., Inc. (DBSD I), 419 B.R. 179, 187-88 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 66.  Id. at 188. 
 67.  Id. at 187. 
 68.  In re DBSD N. Am., Inc. (DBSD II), 634 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 2011).  Although 
acceptance or rejection of a plan is administered on a class-by-class and not creditor-by-
creditor basis, evidently Sprint’s claim made up a large enough portion of the unsecured 
debt that Sprint’s vote was sufficient alone to cause the unsecured class to reject the plan.  
Ralph Brubaker, Taking Chapter 11’s Distribution Rules Seriously: “Inter-Class Gifting is 
Dead! Long Live Inter-Class Gifting!,” 31 No. 4 BANKR. LAW LETTER 1 (Apr. 2011). 
 69.  DBSD I, 419 B.R. at 215. 
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grounds.
70
  Judge Gerber relied on SPM, pointing out that the gifting 
doctrine permits senior creditors to convey to junior classes or interests part 
of the distribution they would otherwise be entitled to.
71
  Noting 
Armstrong, which he recognized that the Southern District of New York 
was not bound by, he wrote that it distinguished rather than rejected SPM, 
and that specifically, it only rejected gifting by unsecured creditors.
72
  He 
suggested that the SPM court would have approved of the gifting scenario 
involving DBSD, since in a case where secured creditors are doing the 
gifting, the rationale in favor of the doctrine is stronger, since the creditor 
has a property interest in that which it is gifting.
73
  The district court in turn 
affirmed the bankruptcy court’s holding on the absolute priority rule issue, 
finding Sprint’s appeal to be without merit in a short portion of its opinion 
in which no cases were cited.
74
 
The case next came up for appeal before the Second Circuit on three 
issues, one of which was whether, under the Bankruptcy Code, a secured 
creditor in a Chapter 11 proceeding can “gift” some of its proceeds from a 
reorganization plan to an equity holder, over the objection of a class of 
unsecured creditors, when the unsecured creditors would have received 
nothing under a pure liquidation dissolution.
75
  The Second Circuit 
overturned the ruling of the bankruptcy court and district court, holding 
that the DBSD plan violated the absolute priority rule.
76
  Although the 
Second Circuit did heavily rely on Armstrong in reversing the order of 
confirmation, unlike the Armstrong plan, this was a case of gifting from 
secured credit to equity, and not from unsecured credit like in Armstrong.  
Further, unlike Armstrong, no classes of the same priority as the “gifters” 
objected, the only objectors being of a more junior class.  While the 
Armstrong iteration was arguably the first test of its kind, something like 
 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. at 210-15. 
 72.  Id. at 212. 
 73.  Id. at 211. 
 74.  In re DBSD N. Am., Inc., No. 09–cv–10156 (LAK), 2010 WL 1223109, at *4-6 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2010). 
 75.  In re DBSD N. Am., Inc. (DBSD II), 634 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2011).  Two other issues 
were considered by the Second Circuit in the DBSD opinion.  With respect to the second 
issue, the court answered the question of whether Sprint had standing to appeal as the holder 
of an indeterminate, unliquidated claim in the form of a pending lawsuit.  The Second 
Circuit held by a 2-1 vote that Sprint did indeed have standing to appeal.  Id. at 85.  The 
third issue was whether the votes of DISH Network, a competitor who had purchased some 
of the secured creditor’s claims for “strategic” reasons, had been properly designated and 
disregarded by the bankruptcy court.  On this issue, the court upheld the decision below, 
holding that the designation of the votes was permissible.  Id. at 104. 
 76.  Id. at 85. 
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DBSD had already been done, for example in the MCorp case.
77
  Therefore, 
the Second Circuit needed either to explicitly reject SPM, or go beyond the 
Armstrong logic in distinguishing SPM.  The result, I would submit, was a 
correct decision based on the text of the Bankruptcy Code, but reveals a 
strained and confusing attempt to follow Armstrong and distinguish SPM. 
The Second Circuit based its holding on a narrow interpretation of 
absolute priority, tracing the history of the rule to its origins in connection 
with the early railroad reorganizations leading up to Boyd, where 
shareholders in the failed entities would often come away with capital 
while junior creditors would take nothing.
78
  The court found that the shares 
of DBSD were distributed “under the plan” and “on account of” its 
previous interest, and were thus in violation of the absolute priority rule.  
The first way in which the court distinguished SPM was on account of SPM 
being based on a Chapter 7 proceeding, while the DBSD plan was a 
Chapter 11 reorganization.  The Second Circuit observed that the statutory 
absolute priority rule applies in Chapter 11, but not in Chapter 7.
79
  SPM 
was also distinguished because the court found that the gifted property in 
SPM could have been be viewed as no longer part of the estate, since the 
automatic stay had been lifted in SPM, while DBSD’s property remained 
part of the estate all along.
80
  Up until this point, the Second Circuit’s 
reasoning could be seen as closely tracking the Third Circuit in Armstrong.  
However, beyond these similarities, there is some divergence between the 
two holdings. 
In rejecting the type of reasoning found in SPM’s progeny, the Second 
Circuit pointed to the Supreme Court’s reasoning in its holdings on the new 
value doctrine, another doctrine applying the absolute priority rule.
81
  The 
DBSD court found that the Supreme Court had indicated a preference for 
reading the absolute priority rule strictly.
82
  The court also pointed to 
Congress’s codification of the absolute priority rule and observed that 
Congress would have inserted a change, had it been their intention to 
update the existing understanding of the absolute priority rule at the time of 
 
 77.  See In re MCorp Fin., 160 B.R. 941, 964 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (holding that in Chapter 
11 liquidation proceedings, it would be permissible for junior creditors to be paid before 
senior creditors, based on asset distribution plans that “accord with the expectations of the 
statutes and the constraints of equity”). 
 78.  DBSD II, 634 F.3d at 94. 
 79.  Id. at 98. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  For a discussion of the new value doctrine, see Skeel, supra note 8, at 233-35. 
 82.  DBSD II, 634 F.3d at 97 (citing Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. 
LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434 (1999); Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 
197 (1988)). 
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the Code’s enactment.
83
  The court also examined the legislative history 
leading up to the enactment of the Code, and quoting the House Committee 
notes, observed that the “absolute priority rule was ‘designed to prevent a 
senior class from giving up consideration to a junior class unless every 
intermediate class consents, is paid in full, or is unimpaired.’”
84
  While the 
circuit court noted the policy arguments for gifting, it also observed some 
policy reasons that it said favor a strict interpretation, particularly an 
incentive for “serious mischief between senior creditors and existing 
shareholders.”
85
  The court did not anywhere attempt to distinguish 
Armstrong’s heavy reliance on the fact that the gifting party in that case 
was not a secured, perfected creditor with a property interest, which of 
course was true of the gifting creditor in DBSD. 
C. Analysis & Implications of the DBSD Holding 
i. Analysis 
The first, and possibly most important, critique of the legal reasoning 
in DBSD deals with its rationale for treating gifting differently in Chapter 
11 than it would be treated in liquidations.  This distinction provides 
virtually the only plausible justification for the Second Circuit purporting 
to accept both SPM and Armstrong, without rejecting one or the other, and 
this Section will contend that the distinction is rather puzzling from a legal 
standpoint.  While it is correct that Section 1129(b)(2) only pertains to 
Chapter 11 proceedings, the Code still provides a distribution scheme for 
Chapter 7 proceedings, which lays out an order of distribution that is 
essentially the exact scheme that the absolute priority rule seeks to enforce 
even when a debtor’s assets are not in fact liquidated and distributed.
86
  The 
opinion does not address the question of why Congress would want to 
protect creditors in reorganizations, but not in liquidations.  If anything, 
creditors would seem to need more protection in liquidation proceedings 
because of the finality of the matter.  Here, with Sprint slated to receive 
equity possibly worth up to nearly half of the value of its original claim, the 
incentive is for everyone to maximize the value of the reorganized entity.  
Further, in the Armstrong case, the Third Circuit laid out three main 
avenues in which it distinguished the plan it was reviewing from the SPM 
plan: 
 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. at 100-01 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 416 (1977) reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6372). 
 85.  Id. at 100. 
 86.  11 U.S.C. § 726 (2012). 
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(1) SPM involved a distribution under Chapter 7, which did not 
trigger 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii); (2) the senior creditor had a 
perfected security interest, meaning that the property was not 
subject to distribution under the Bankruptcy Code’s priority 
scheme; and (3) the distribution was a “carve out,” a situation 
where a party whose claim is secured by assets in the bankruptcy 
estate allows a portion of its lien proceeds to be paid to others.
87
 
If we were to apply this Armstrong test to the facts of DBSD, of the 
three distinguishing factors, only the first could be said to be sufficient to 
distinguish DBSD from SPM without rejecting SPM.  Looking at the 
second factor, DBSD’s creditor who provided the gifted consideration did 
have a perfected security interest,
88
 and the distribution was similarly a 
situation where a secured creditor allowed some of its proceeds to be paid 
to others.
89
  Further, the SPM plan was not entirely a carve out in the usual 
sense of the word, since it provided for recovery beyond administrative 
expenses.
90
  Therefore, if the first of the three avenues—the difference 
between Chapter 7 and Chapter 11—was not found to be on solid legal 
footing, the DBSD court’s attempt to distinguish its holding from SPM 
would be on shaky ground indeed.  And as discussed earlier, neither of the 
circuit cases rejecting gifting have explained why it would be appropriate 
to circumvent the distribution scheme in Section 726 of the Code in a 
Chapter 7 proceeding, but not to circumvent the exact same order of 
priority in Section 1129 in a Chapter 11 case.  Further, like Armstrong, the 
DBSD court makes no attempt to explain why the First Circuit gave the 
SPM plan its full blessing even though it was conceived in Chapter 11.
91
  It 
also implicitly rejects the reasoning in SPM, stating, “creditors are 
generally free to do whatever they wish with the bankruptcy dividends they 
receive . . . .”
92
  Therefore, while the facts in Armstrong lent themselves to 
the possibility of distinguishing the First Circuit’s SPM holding while 
rejecting gifting in the Armstrong case itself, I would assert that DBSD 
provides no convincing facts distinguishing its rejection of gifting from 
SPM’s approval of the practice, thus creating a split between the two 
circuits in all but name. 
 
 87.  In re Armstrong, 432 F.3d 507, 514 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 88.  In re DBSD N. Am., Inc. (DBSD I), 419 B.R. 179, 214 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 89.  Id. at 186. 
 90.  See Levin, supra note 57 (explaining that a “carve out” generally refers to money 
set aside to pay for administrative expenses). 
 91.  See In re Armstrong (Armstrong II), 432 F.3d at 518; In re SPM Mfg. Corp., 984 
F.2d 1305, 1317 (1st Cir. 1993) (explaining that “we cannot find support for appellees’ 
assertion that this agreement conflicts with any policy in favor of reorganizations manifested 
by Chapter 11”). 
 92.  In re SPM Mfg. Corp., 984 F.2d 1305, 1313 (1st Cir. 1993). 
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There are also some important ways in which DBSD diverges from the 
Second Circuit’s Armstrong reasoning, despite both courts rejecting gifting 
in the context of a Chapter 11 plan.  To the extent that the Armstrong court 
held that the claim of a senior creditor with a perfected security interest is 
“not subject to distribution under the Bankruptcy Code’s priority 
scheme,”
93
 DBSD rejects this analysis, as it holds that such a creditor is 
indeed subject to the priority scheme.  Here one can see already where the 
Second Circuit’s attempts to avoid declaring a circuit split and square its 
holding with the two prior circuit decisions are coming apart. 
Another potentially troubling product of the DBSD holding is the 
court’s reliance on two United States Supreme Court cases that it concludes 
“indicate a preference for reading the [absolute priority] rule strictly.”
94
  
While this logic gives the Second Circuit a precedential hook for its 
holding, I would argue that it was not necessary and problematically calls 
the new value corollary into question.  Acknowledging that the two 
Supreme Court cases did not address the scenario before it, the DBSD court 
asserts that the Supreme Court’s “two post-Code cases on the rule are 
instructive.  In both cases, the prior owners tried to avoid the absolute 
priority rule by arguing that they received distributions not on account of 
their prior interests but rather on account of the new value that they would 
contribute to the entity,” going on to note that in both cases, the Supreme 
Court rejected those arguments.
95
  In examining 203 N. LaSalle, one would 
be hard-pressed to find a general preference for strict interpretation.  In that 
case, the Supreme Court declined to issue a ruling on the general validity of 
a “new value” corollary to the absolute priority rule.
96
  The “new value” 
corollary, the logic goes, allows a distribution to equity holders in a 
Chapter 11 case, not on account of their previous status as owners, but on 
account of “new value” being contributed to the reorganization.
97
  Like the 
gifting doctrine, there is no reference in the 1978 Code to an exception for 
new value.  However, the 203 N. LaSalle court noted that although there is 
“no literal reference to new value” in the statute, it did “nothing to 
disparage the possibility apparent in the statutory text, that the absolute 
priority rule . . . may carry a new value corollary.”
98
  While the Court did 
not rule on this issue, these words certainly appear to portray it as open to 
 
 93.  Armstrong II, 432 F.3d at 514. 
 94.  DBSD II, 634 F.3d at 97 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Savings 
Ass'n v. 203 N. Lasalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S. 434, 437 (1999) [hereinafter 203 N. LaSalle] 
and Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988)). 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 449. 
 97.  Id. at 443. 
 98.  Id. at 449. 
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the possibility of reading a doctrine into Section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) that is 
not contained in the text of the statute—certainly not a general preference 
for strict interpretation of the statute.  Instead, the Supreme Court 
adjudicated the case by determining what the phrase “on account of” within 
the statute means, considering three possible interpretations.
99
  In fact, 
although the Supreme Court in 203 N. LaSalle did not reach the validity of 
new value, it did recognize a procedural safeguard built into the new value 
doctrine—the requirement that the new value contributed be “reasonably 
equivalent” to property received in a reorganization.
100
 
Considering the second Supreme Court case, Norwest Bank 
Worthington v. Ahlers,
101
 which preceded 203 N. LaSalle by ten years, we 
find similar language in dicta by the Court, where it stated that it did not 
wish to “comment on the continuing vitality of the . . . [New Value] 
exception.”
102
  The Court held that even if the new value exception did 
apply, it was not met by the parties in the case—farmers who retained an 
equity stake in their farm in return for their labor and expertise.  The Court 
held that these factors would not count as measureable value.
103
  Although 
the Ahlers court may not have read the applicable statute as liberally as 
some practitioners would have liked, affirming the vitality of new value, it 
again seems a stretch to proclaim that Ahlers stands for strict interpretation 
of Section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).  In fact, some have opined that the Ahlers 
court failed to take a strict textualist approach to the Code, considering that 
it passed on the opportunity to hold invalid a doctrine that is nowhere stated 
in the statute.
104
  By declaring that the two Supreme Court decisions on 
 
 99.  Id. at 450-51.  For a more thorough discussion of 203 N. LaSalle, see Bruce A. 
Markell, LaSalle and the Little Guy: Some Initial Musings on the Ultimate Impact of Bank 
of America, NT & SA v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership, 16 BANKR. DEV. J. 345 
(2000). 
 100.  203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 443, 445. 
 101.  485 U.S. 197 (1988). 
 102.  Id. at 203-04 n.3. 
 103.  Id. at 203-06.  Inexplicably, the Second Circuit pointed out that the “continued 
cooperation and assistance” the existing shareholder of DBSD would contribute to the 
reorganized entity sounded a lot like the labor and expertise that was rejected as constituting 
new value by the Supreme Court in Ahlers.  In re DBSD N. Am., Inc. (DBSD II), 634 F.3d 
79, 96 (2d Cir. 2011).  I describe this as inexplicable because since a new value exception 
was not sought, the debtor neither claimed to or needed to offer anything of value to in order 
to satisfy § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) under the doctrine it sought to use in seeking confirmation.     
 104.  See John D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute Priority After Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REV. 
963, 1009-11 (1989) (explaining the Solicitor General’s arguments (as Amicus Curiae) in 
Ahlers that the new value doctrine should be rejected and contending that, first, there had 
never been an adequate doctrinal basis for the new value exception, and alternatively, that 
the rule had been abolished by the Bankruptcy Code.  The author argues that despite the 
plausibility of these arguments and what he called the “evanescent” nature of the new value 
exception, the Supreme Court declined to take a strict interpretation of the Code, as it could 
CARNEVALE_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/23/2013  8:02 PM 
2012] IS GIFTING DEAD IN CHAPTER 11? 241 
 
Section 1129 indicate a general preference for strict interpretation, the 
DBSD court unnecessarily invites future courts to open the door to question 
the ongoing validity of new value in reorganizations. 
In the end, while the DBSD court may have had difficulty trying to 
reconcile its holding with those found in SPM and Armstrong and 
grounding it in Supreme Court precedent, the reality is the plan that the 
Boyd court rejected almost a century ago was in some respects similar to 
the proposed plan in DBSD.  In fact, the debtor in Boyd used the argument 
that since “there was nothing which could come to the unsecured creditors” 
because secured debts were undercapitalized, that “they, therefore, had no 
ground to complain if the bondholders were willing to give new shares to 
the old stockholders.”
105
  This argument bears a striking resemblance to that 
used by the DBSD Bankruptcy Judge, who held that: 
[I]f the secured creditor class is undersecured, that will mean, at 
least in most cases (as it does here), that any complaining creditor 
would get nothing anyway, whether or not the gift had been 
made—making it difficult, if not impossible, to see how the 
complaining creditor can be legitimately aggrieved by the gift.
106
 
So, if Boyd is indeed still good law, then it would follow that the 
bankruptcy court did err in confirming DBSD’s reorganization plan, by 
using the same logic that was dismissed in Boyd.  When Congress enacted 
the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, it effectually codified the “fixed principle” 
from Boyd without any pertinent modification, thereby indicating an 
approval of the existing state of the doctrine, of which Boyd was a crucial 
part.
107
 
Furthermore, the Second Circuit makes a compelling argument as to 
the intention of the framers of Section 1129 when it analyzes the House and 
Senate committee notes in support of a rule against gifting.
108
  The logical 
 
have done by holding that no new value exception existed). 
 105.  N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 505 (1913). 
 106.  DBSD I, 419 B.R. 179, 211 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 107.  Congress did, in fact, change one aspect of the absolute priority rule when writing 
it into the Bankruptcy code.  Under Boyd, a reorganization could not be confirmed in 
violation of the “fixed principle” even if all parties consented.  Under the 1978 Code, a class 
must object in order for a violation to exist.  Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (maintaining 
that a class must object in order for a violation to exist) with Boyd, 228 U.S. at 507 (holding 
that a reorganization could not be confirmed in violation of “the fixed principle” even if all 
parties consented). 
 108.  See DBSD II, 634 F.3d 79, 100-01 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing a House Committee report 
referring to an earlier version of the bill which eventually became Section 1129(b)(2) with 
only minor stylistic changes, indicating that the rule was “designed to prevent a senior class 
from giving up consideration to a junior class unless every intermediate class consents, is 
paid in full, or is unimpaired.”) (citation omitted). 
CARNEVALE_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/23/2013  8:02 PM 
242 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 15:1 
 
question that follows is what the practical implications of the holding will 
be, and whether the concerns that were behind the Boyd decision are still 
present today as a reason for justifying the rule. 
ii. Implications of the Holding. 
The only two circuits that have considered the gifting doctrine since 
SPM are the Second and the Third.  As both have rejected gifting in the 
cases before them, firms representing parties in bankruptcies in these 
circuits need to find other ways to advise their clients to reach consensus 
where gifting might have previously been viable.  As these two circuits 
have in their jurisdiction the two largest forums for complex corporate 
reorganizations—the District of Delaware and the Southern District of New 
York
109
—the disapproval of the practice is likely to have more effect than 
the holdings of two circuits might in another area of the law.  It is likely 
that as future Chapter 11 filings arise, the new narrower interpretation of 
the absolute priority rule will restrict the parties’ abilities to explore certain 
types of compromises in complex reorganization attempts.  As an example, 
the Worldcom bankruptcy (confirmed prior to both the Armstrong and 
DBSD holdings) was recently declared the third-largest bankruptcy of all 
time, and at the time of its filing, was the largest.
110
  Use of the gifting 
doctrine was one of the mechanisms implemented during that colossal 
reorganization.  The bankruptcy court reviewing Worldcom’s plan 
summarily held that “enhanced value received by holders of [unsecured] 
claims on account of contributions from other Classes is not a treatment of 
these Claims under the plan and does not constitute unfair 
discrimination.”
111
  Without a detailed discussion, the court further stated 
that “[c]reditors are generally free to do whatever they wish with the 
bankruptcy dividends they receive, including sharing them with other 
creditors.”
112
  The change in the state of the law in the eight years between 
Worldcom and DBSD is striking, as it is unlikely any bankruptcy court in 
any circuit today could summarily approve a plan including gifting as it did 
in Worldcom, without at least some effort to distinguish DBSD and 
Armstrong.  While in Worldcom the gifting was from one class of creditors 
 
 109.  Bankruptcy by the Numbers, supra note 58. 
 110.  Shira Ovide, MF Global: Likely among the 10 biggest bankruptcies ever, WSJ 
BLOGS (Oct. 31, 2011, 10:38 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2011/10/31/mf-global-likely-
among-the-10-biggest-bankruptcies-ever/. 
 111.  In re Worldcom, Inc., No. 02-13533(AJG), 2003 WL 23861928, at *60 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2003) (citing SPM, 984 F.2d 1305 and MCorp, 160 B.R. 941) [hereinafter 
Worldcom]. 
 112.  Id. at *61. 
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to a more junior class, it is highly likely that applying the current 
interpretation of the absolute priority rule governing the Second Circuit, 
this plan of reorganization could have been rejected.
113
 
Prior to DBSD, it was thought that gifting was more controversial 
when coming from unsecured creditors.  The main case disapproving of 
gifting—Armstrong—spent a considerable amount of time explaining why 
courts should be more wary in this situation than if secured creditors were 
giving up part of their recoveries.  However, DBSD took Armstrong a step 
further, in disapproving of gifting by a secured creditor—one with a 
property interest in that which is being gifted.  As a result, advisors in any 
jurisdiction must consider the possibility that bankruptcy and district courts 
will follow the Armstrong and DBSD rulings.  The limits on acceptable 
parameters within a plan will result in practitioners working around these 
issues at an earlier stage in bankruptcy proceedings.  Therefore, the ruling 
has the potential to be a game changer, at least in certain Chapter 11 cases. 
It is also easy to see how an attack could be formed on the new value 
corollary using the same logic that the DBSD court expounded.  Just as 
gifting is found nowhere in the 1978 Code, the new value corollary also is 
not codified.  Ahlers and 203 N. LaSalle refused to affirm the existence of 
the new value corollary, so critics of the decision will point out that it 
invites parties to the next Chapter 11 filing who want to hold off 
confirmation to argue that the new value exception is also not within the 
plain meaning of the Code.  The one difference, of course, is that prior to 
the enactment of the Code, the Supreme Court had arguably held in favor 
of a new value exception in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Co.
114
  However, 
the last time that it took a case on the absolute priority rule, the Supreme 
Court observed that the vitality of new value based on this reasoning is far 
from clear.  First, it pointed out that the concept of new value “never rose 
above the technical level of dictum in any opinion of this Court.”
115
  The 
Supreme Court went on to observe that Congress could have included a 
provision in the Code that would allow exceptions for contributions of new 
value, but chose not to do so, despite debating several proposed revisions to 
the absolute priority rule.
116
  Therefore, there is no clear answer to this 
question.  One side will argue that Los Angeles Lumber sanctioned the new 
 
 113.  See Miller & Berkovich, supra note 16, at 1398-1405 for a detailed discussion of 
the Worldcom plan.  Miller and Berkovich, ardent proponents of gifting, acknowledge that 
Worldcom arguably took the gifting doctrine too far even before the cases reining in the 
practice.  Id. at 1404. 
 114.  308 U.S. 106 (1939). 
 115.  Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 445 
(1999). 
 116.  Id. at 446–47. 
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value doctrine, and Congress took the state of the law as it found it when it 
enacted the Bankruptcy Code.  However, the response, which is solidified 
by the plain meaning approach that DBSD takes, is that Congress would 
have simply codified the new value doctrine if they intended it to be a valid 
exception or corollary to the absolute priority rule, just as they changed the 
rule to allow confirmation of plans with no objecting classes as discussed 
earlier.  Whether a new value corollary or exception is necessary or 
valuable is beyond the scope of this Comment; however, suffice it to say 
that many academics and practitioners have commented on its importance 
and observed that complex reorganizations would often become far more 
difficult to effect without it.
117
  Many agree with the policy rationale that 
the Los Angeles Lumber court itself recognized, which is that allowing 
existing equity holders to contribute capital is an important consideration as 
they may be the best source of cash for a reorganization.
118
 
The current state of gifting under DBSD results in a partial shift in 
leverage from equity holders to out-of-the-money, unsecured creditors.  As 
the Second Circuit recognized, Sprint did not object to the plan because it 
was unhappy with the amount it was receiving.  Indeed, if all efforts to 
reorganize failed and DBSD had been liquidated, Sprint would have 
received nothing.  Most unsecured creditors in this position object for 
leveraging or strategic purposes.  Indeed, Sprint may have wanted to use its 
leverage to increase its share in the reorganized entity.
119
  The Second 
Circuit holding thus shifts some of the power to hold up a reorganization 
plan away from shareholders to creditors.  This power may diverge at times 
from a maximum-recovery standard.  As the bankruptcy court pointed out, 
Sprint would have done considerably better under the plan it opposed than 
 
 117.  See David R. Kuney & Timothy R. Epp, Aftermath of Bonner Mall: Evolution or 
Regression in the Notion of “New Value”?, 5 J. BANKR. L & PRAC. 211 (1996) (arguing that 
the new value doctrine as an exception to absolute priority is critical to the practice of 
bankruptcy law and reorganization); Charles W. Adams, New Capital for Bankruptcy 
Reorganizations: It’s the Amount that Counts, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 411 (1995) (arguing that 
reorganizations have historically been more efficient when shareholders provide new capital 
in a reorganization, and discussing problems with turning creditors into owners); Miller & 
Berkovich, supra note 16, (arguing that the new value should be recognized); Elizabeth 
Warren, A Theory of Absolute Priority, 1991 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 9 (making the case that 
new value is permitted under the Code, and is incorrectly called an “exception” because its 
use does not violate the absolute priority rule to begin with if old equity’s participation is 
not on account of its former equity interest).  But See Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auctions, 
and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 44 STAN. L. REV. 69 (1991) (arguing 
that the new value corollary or exception unfairly impairs the rights of unpaid creditors in 
favor of debtor control, has no justification under the Bankruptcy Code, and should be 
rejected). 
 118.  Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 121 (1939). 
 119.  In re DBSD N. Am., Inc. (DBSD II), 634 F.3d 79, 92 (2d Cir. 2011). 
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it had a right to do from a liquidation standpoint.  The Second Circuit, 
however, was clear to emphasize that whether the plan was in Sprint’s best 
interests was not relevant—the court clearly thought that it should be left to 
Sprint to object to the plan if it believed the plan was not in its best 
interests, whether that was a good business decision or not.  Sprint’s 
opposition, despite its potential considerable recovery as an “out-of-the-
money” unsecured creditor, shows that its objective was likely bargaining 
leverage. 
The recent developments restricting gifting arguably serve to balance 
the power during reorganization, rather than redistribute it all to creditors.  
After all, equity holders are not without their own leverage in 
reorganizations, even without the ability to make a deal with secured 
creditors involving gifts.  For example, equity holders sometimes have the 
ability to compel a shareholder meeting for the strategic purpose of electing 
a new board during reorganization proceedings.
120
  Furthermore, if 
shareholders perceive that they will walk away empty-handed, they can 
threaten to proceed with costly valuation rather than propose a plan in 
which they take nothing.
121
  In addition, during the first 120 days after 
filing, the debtor has the exclusive right to propose reorganization plans, a 
power that can be extended to as long as eighteen months.
122
  In a case 
survey, Lynn LoPucki and William Whitford found that extensions beyond 
the 120 days are granted quite routinely.
123
  And if each class agrees to a 
plan, it will be confirmed, even if it results in a distribution to the “old” 
equity holder.  Since equity holders have a number of sources of leverage 
even without the ability to “cram-down” a plan involving gifting, perhaps 
the better balance of bargaining power is to allow unsecured creditors the 
bargaining chip of being able to object to a plan, such as the one proposed 
by DBSD here. 
As future bankruptcy cases arise, the DBSD holding will no doubt 
spur creativity on the part of practitioners, as restrictive holdings tend to 
do.  Interestingly, one debtor sought to confirm a plan involving such a 
creative “gift” shortly prior to DBSD.  In In re Journal Register Co., a 
 
 120.  See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 801 F.2d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that the 
right to call a shareholders meeting continues with a debtor-in-possession during 
reorganization).  But see Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Preemptive Cram 
Down, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 625, 635 (1991) (explaining that in certain situations, former 
equity holders can no longer call shareholder meetings during Chapter 11). 
 121.  See Lynn M. Lopucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining over Equity’s Share in 
the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125 
(1990) (explaining that parties often compromise their interests so as to avoid the time and 
expense involved in valuation). 
 122.  11 U.S.C. § 1121 (2012). 
 123.  Lopucki & Whitford, supra note 121, at 128. 
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bankruptcy court in the Southern District of New York approved a Chapter 
11 plan in which a distribution was voluntarily diverted from secured 
creditors to trade creditors to ensure goodwill.
124
  The plan carefully 
stipulated that it be placed in a “so-called trade account” that was explicitly 
designated not to be property of the debtors.
125
  It will be interesting to see 
whether such a method of short-circuiting the no-gifting rule in the Second 
Circuit would be successful if tested after DBSD, although it would seem 
unlikely. 
IV. THINKING AHEAD TO A SUPREME COURT RULING ON THE MATTER 
A. Why the Issue is Ripe for Supreme Court Adjudication 
The last time the Supreme Court granted certiorari on an absolute 
priority case, a similar circuit split had developed.
126
  The time before that 
was in Ahlers, where although no circuit split existed, the case had been 
heard by the Eighth Circuit and there was a vigorous dissent.
127
  Neither of 
those cases resolved the issue of whether a new value corollary exists post-
enactment of the Bankruptcy Code.  This issue, on the other hand, would 
be a good opportunity to eliminate confusion over which principles taken 
from the complex and often contradictory framework of First, Second, and 
Third Circuit cases on absolute priority discussed in this Comment are to 
be applied in future bankruptcies.  Additionally, because the two prior 
Supreme Court cases did little to provide rules to apply in future filings, the 
Supreme Court could take advantage of this opportunity to lay down a clear 
rule.  In addition, while the Court would not likely be able to rule on new 
value at the same time as gifting, it would be possible to dismiss gifting 
using reasoning that could not be applied to militate against new value, in 
contrast to the Second Circuit’s recent decision.
128
 
 
 124.  In re Journal Register Co, 407 B.R. 520, 527 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2009). 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  See Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 
443 (1999) (detailing the circuit splits between the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, and the 
Second and Fourth Circuits). 
 127.  Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988) (Gibson, J. Dissenting). 
   128.   Following the Second Circuit’s decision, DBSD pursued a sale rather than a new 
plan proposal, and evidently chose not to pursue a petition for certiorari.  DISH Network 
Corp. agreed to acquire the debtor out of bankruptcy several months after the decision was 
announced by the Second Circuit, and the sale was approved by the FCC in March 2012.  
Joseph Checkler, Judge Says DBSD Can Move Forward With Sale to Dish Newtork, Dow 
Jones News Service, Mar. 15, 2011; Anton Troianovski and Amy Schatz, Corporate News: 
FCC Deals a Setback to Dish’s Wireless Network Plans, Wall St. J., Mar. 5, 2012, at B3.    
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B. Why the Court Should Reject Gifting, While Distinguishing New 
Value 
The arguments in favor of gifting are significantly weaker than those 
in favor of new value, from both a policy and a doctrinal perspective.  
Should the Supreme Court accept this case or a future one involving the 
gifting doctrine, the Court would thus do well to be mindful that the 
specific reasoning relied upon may well influence the vitality of new value.  
After all, the DBSD court relied in part on the Supreme Court’s past new 
value decisions to invalidate gifting.
129
  Since new value is a doctrine that 
the Bankruptcy Bar has long relied on, and academics, practitioners, and 
even the Supreme Court have recognized the importance of raising new 
capital from existing shareholders, the Supreme Court should be wary of 
chipping away at this doctrine.
130
  Further, the new value rule has an 
important safeguard to prevent abuse—the value received must be 
“reasonably equivalent” to new capital contributed, which ensures that 
existing shareholders do not use the rule as an end run around the absolute 
priority rule.
131
  Without a comparable safeguard in the gifting context, 
courts have reason for concern that gifting could be used in nefarious 
manners, even if the parties in DBSD had no such intent.  Indeed, the 
Second Circuit warned about “serious mischief” should this type of gifting 
arrangement be sanctioned by the courts.
132
  Presumably, the court was 
worried because the old equity holder who is on the receiving end of the 
five percent “gift” is the same entity that is crafting the reorganization plan.  
Perhaps the court was concerned that although the unsecured debtholder 
was not injured here, in some other case, the plan proponent might 
conveniently inflate the amount of a creditor’s priority claim when crafting 
the plan in exchange for a generous “gift.”
133
 
In developing the legal reasoning, the legislative history approach that 
the DBSD court mentioned in passing would be a good place to start.  The 
House and Senate committee notes preceding the adoption of the 
Bankruptcy Code could be weighed in formulating a rule in a way that 
would properly dismiss the gifting doctrine as used over the past two 
 
 129.  In re DBSD N. Am., Inc. (DBSD II), 634 F.3d 79, 97 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 130.  See supra text accompanying notes 113–17 (providing examples of academic 
support for raising new capital from shareholders). 
 131.  203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 442-45 (1999). 
 132.  DBSD II, 634 F.3d at 100. 
 133.  But see Miller & Berkovich, supra note 16, at 1408-12 (describing what would 
likely be the practitioners’ rejoinder to the concerns about mischief—citing cases in which 
Bankruptcy courts have rejected plans in which gifting was used for nefarious or improper 
ends, such as In re Scott Cable Comm’s Inc., 227 B.R. 596 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998) and In 
re Goffena, 175 B.R. 386 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1994)). 
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decades, while clearly signaling that the new value doctrine is not in 
question.  As briefly discussed in DBSD, the Congressional Commission 
assigned to make recommendations pertaining to the Code suggested 
allowing equity owners to retain an interest if they would contribute 
something essential, such as expertise, to the business.
134
  However, 
Congress decided not to create an exception for gifts, although they did 
make some changes to the existing framework, such as only allowing 
classes of creditors, rather than individual creditors, to invoke the rule.
135
  
But the story is not exactly the same when one ponders the legislative 
history with a mind toward the new value corollary.  The very fact that the 
Bankruptcy Commission, in trying to make absolute priority more fluid, 
considered changing the rule to allow non-monetary new value 
contributions appears to indicate that they never even considered the 
possibility that monetary contributions would not be permitted.  In fact, a 
proposed bill containing non-monetary new value was introduced several 
times, and the House engaged in “extensive hearings” on the proposed 
bills.
136
  Certainly the Committee did not intend to allow non-monetary new 
value contributions, but reject the more important monetary contributions 
often necessary to achieve reorganization, that were understood by many to 
be already sanctioned by Los Angeles Lumber.  Therefore, a ruling that 
focuses on the legislative history would likely be quite effective in 
reaffirming Congress’s purpose in making the changes that it wanted and 
leaving out those it did not desire.  In addition, while the question of 
whether Los Angeles Lumber firmly established new value can be debated, 
what is not in question is that there was no Supreme Court analogue 
approving of gifting prior to the enactment of the Code.  Using these lines 
of reasoning, the Court could effectively affirm the Second Circuit on 
somewhat different grounds without calling into question firmly entrenched 
doctrine. 
Should the Court take a gifting case, it may also have the choice 
between limiting its holding to the Chapter 11 cases, or issuing a broad 
ruling that would also cover Chapter 7.  Although the legislative history 
leading up to the enactment of Section 1129 would not work to strike down 
gifting in a Chapter 7 scenario, if the holding restricts the practice of 
gifting, it is difficult to articulate a policy or statutory rationale why gifting 
in Chapter 7 should be permitted.  Courts should have the same reasons to 
be wary of abuse by junior classes in Chapter 7 proceedings that exist in 
 
 134.  See Markell, supra note 117, at 88-89 nn.116, 117 (citing Bankruptcy Commission 
of the United States, Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United 
States, H.R. Doc. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)). 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 446-47. 
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Chapter 11.  Further, there is nothing in the Chapter 7 distribution scheme 
statute to indicate that it was meant to be more malleable or less absolute 
than Section 1129. 
In formulating a rule for ascertaining the plain meaning of provisions 
in the Bankruptcy Code, the Supreme Court would also do well to be wary 
of grounding a holding on “plain meaning” in any sense that does not 
involve legislative history.  Such a holding would be likely to be used in 
the lower courts to attempt to chip away at the new value line of cases. 
C. What the Holding Likely Would Be 
In a recent and instructive case, the Supreme Court held in favor of a 
narrow reading of the Bankruptcy Code by a 9-0 vote in Milavetz, Gallop 
& Milavetz, P.A. v. United States.
137
  The Milavetz Court declined an 
invitation to take a creative view of several provisions of the portion of the 
Bankruptcy Code at issue before it.
138
  In another recent Supreme Court 
decision applying the Bankruptcy Code, Marrama v. Citizens Bank,
139
 the 
Court decided by a 5-4 vote that a bad-faith exception could be implied into 
Section 1307(c), allowing dismissal of a bankruptcy filing for pre-petition 
bad-faith conduct.
140
  This is notwithstanding the fact that the statute 
mentions ten causes justifying that relief, none of which is prepetition bad 
faith conduct.
141
  The four dissenters, led by Justice Alito, would have 
followed the plain language of the statute and would not have implied a 
bad-faith exception, holding that a bankruptcy court’s “general and 
equitable powers ‘must and can only be exercised within the confines of 
the Bankruptcy Code.’”
142
  While it might seem that this case would imply 
that the Court is open to reading language into the Code on policy grounds, 
I would posit that the case against gifting is an easier case to make based on 
plain language, and for that reason the same four dissenters, all of whom 
are still on the Court, would find that gifting is not implied in Section 
1129(b), and would be joined by at least one other justice, due to the fact 
that it is a clearer case.
143
 
 
 137.  130 S. Ct. 1324 (2010). 
 138.  See id. at 1331-32 (explaining how the Court arrived at its definition of the term 
“debt relief agency”). 
 139.  Marrama v. Citizens Bank, 549 U.S. 365 (2007). 
 140.  Id. at 371. 
 141.  Id. at 373. 
 142.  Id. at 382 (Alito, J. Dissenting) (citing Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 
U.S. 197, 206 (1988)).  
 143.  It is recognized by the author that based on their judicial philosophies, some of the 
four justices in the Marrama dissent, most notably Justice Scalia, would be unlikely to join 
an opinion relying on legislative history, as proposed in part B of this section.  Another 
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CONCLUSION 
Whether the Supreme Court would be inclined to hold in favor of 
gifting, however, does not answer the question of whether a narrow 
interpretation of the absolute priority rule is necessary to prevent the evils 
that the Boyd Court was concerned with nearly a century ago.  The railroad 
reorganizations of that time involved an enormous part of the nation’s 
economy.  By 1915, approximately half of the nation’s railroads had 
defaulted on their debt.
144
  As of 1906, twelve billion of eighteen billion 
dollars in outstanding railroad securities were held by the public.
145
  The 
most efficient method of reorganizing came to be the equity receivership.
146
  
Bondholders and shareholders would work together—or collude, 
depending on one’s viewpoint on this kind of collaboration—to reorganize.  
In essence, the bondholders were often able to have their own claims 
satisfied, squeeze out unsecured creditors so they would receive nothing, 
and shareholders would receive new equity for a fraction of its actual 
value.
147
  Looking at the developments leading up to Boyd from this 
perspective, it is unsurprising that the Court determined the need for a 
“fixed principle.”  While the recent practice of gifting is probably not 
authorized under the existing Bankruptcy Code, a Supreme Court ruling 
handing down a definitive answer to that question will provide needed 
clarification for bankruptcy advisors.  Perhaps bankruptcy attorneys will 
find efficient ways to achieve reorganizations without the option of gifting.  
Or, a consensus might develop that gifting in limited circumstances does 
add value systemically, and the proper safeguards can be effectively 
applied to prevent the type of abuse prevalent in the Boyd era.  In that 
instance, perhaps a legislative approach would be the best solution.  
 
recent Supreme Court case interpreting the Bankruptcy Code is RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 
LLC et al. v. Amalgamated Bank, where the Court held in an 8-0 decision that Section 
1129(b)(2)(A) of the Code should not be read in a manner that is “hyperliteral and contrary 
to common sense.” 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2070 (2012).  While not related in any substantive 
manner, this recent opinion may also be instructive on the potential outcome of a gifting 
decision.  While a case could be made that it would take a similar “hyperliteral,” aggressive 
texualist interpretation of the Code to invalidate the new value doctrine, gifting would be 
much easier to invalidate under a traditional plain-language approach.  For further 
discussion of the RadLAX decision, see Ralph Brubaker, Credit Bidding and the Secured 
Creditor’s Baseline Distributional Entitlement in Chapter 11, 32 No. 7 BANKR. LAW LETTER 
1 (July 2012). 
 144.  WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, RAILROADS: FINANCE & ORGANIZATION 374 (1915). 
 145.  Id. at 62-63. 
 146.  See Markell, supra note 117, at 75 (explaining the efficiency of the equity 
receivership for railroads). 
 147.  See Swaine, supra note 7, at 914-17 (detailing the process by which reorganization 
occurs in this manner). 
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Nothing would prevent the bar from lobbying for an amendment to the 
Bankruptcy Code explicitly permitting gifting in certain circumstances and 
with certain stipulations, perhaps similar stipulations to those proposed 
leading up to the enactment of the 1978 Code.  This approach would be 
preferable to the confusing web of cases that are presently on the books as 
controlling law. 
 
